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FOREWORD: RACIST SPEECH ON CAMPUS
KINGsLEY R. BROWNEt

The issue of race relations appears to many the most intractable
domestic problem facing the United States today. We are told that
tensions between the races have increased substantially during the
last decade, although it is difficult to demonstrate the truth or
falsity of that assertion. Although more incidents are labeled as
racial than a decade ago, substantial incentives exist to so label
disputes, both for disputants-in the form of immediate attention
of policy makers and the press-and for the press itself-which
has come to learn that consumers of news have a voracious appetite
for racial disputes. Thus, for example, an ordinary traffic accident
in which a Hasidic Jew kills a black child is converted from a
private tragedy into front-page national news.
To the extent that there actually is an increase in racial tensions
and incidents, a number of causes have been suggested. These
range from an asserted greater social acceptability of expressions
of racism under President Reagan-a dubious assertion in a decade
when public statements of even arguably racist attitudes have
resulted in substantial public censure'-to a white backlash over
racial preferences for minorities.
This symposium issue of THE WAYNE LAW REVIEw addresses
one of the most visible signs of racial turmoil in this country,
racist speech on college and university campuses, and it focuses
on an increasingly popular form of symptomatic relief-the suppression of that speech by "racist speech codes." The first three
articles provide different perspectives on the case of Doe v. Unit Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University. B.A., 1975,
George Washington University; M.A., 1976, University of Colorado; J.D., 1982,
University of Denver.
1. Consider, for example, the experiences of James Watt, Earl Butz, Al
Campanis, Jimmy Breslin, and Andy Rooney.
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versity of Michigan.2 Judge Avern Cohn furnishes insight into the
process by which he concluded that the University of Michigan
racist-speech policy violated the first amendment. Professor Robert
Sedler, who represented Doe, argues that campus speech codes are
fundamentally misconceived, having as they do the objective of
prohibition of racist ideas. In contrast, Henry Saad, who represented the University of Michigan in Doe, argues that campus
bans on racist speech, if properly tailored, are justified by goals
of racial equality.
Professor Charles Martin's essay examines the origins of racial
conflict on campuses beginning with the desegregation of professional schools and goes on to discuss some of the current manifestations of this conflict. Professor Charles Jones argues that
regulation of racist speech is warranted because of the substantial
injury such speech causes to minorities in particular and to the
cause of equality in general. He takes the position that first
amendment values have been improperly elevated over equality
values.
Patricia Hodulik, Senior System Legal Counsel for the University of Wisconsin, describes the experience of the University of
Wisconsin, which has also adopted a racist-speech code that is
currently under challenge. Ms. Hodulik argues that the Wisconsin
code, which is narrower than the invalidated Michigan code, is
both protective of first amendment values and an effective response
to campus harassment.3 Professor Alan Brownstein advocates
adoption of codes that concentrate on voluntary mediation and
conciliation of specific disputes. He suggests that universities can
avoid problems of vagueness and overbreadth by limiting sanctions
to repetition of speech that is on a list of specifically condemned
racist speech, a list that will evolve as the university rules on
complaints in specific instances.
Finally, Congressman Henry Hyde and George Fishman make
a case for a pending bill, entitled the Collegiate Speech Protection
Act, that would extend the first amendment protection enjoyed by

2. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
3. As this issue was going to press, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin issued a decision striking down the Wisconsin
code. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin
System, No. 90-C-328 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 11, 1991). The decision was based primarily
upon the court's conclusion that the code was unconstitutionally overbroad
because it reached a substantial amount of speech that did not constitute "fighting
words" under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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students in public universities to students in private universities
that receive federal funds. They chronicle examples of suppression
of expression on campus and describe the operation of the bill.
The depth of the division between those advocating suppression
of racist speech and those resisting such suppression unfortunately
has become obscured by the rhetoric of common ground. Those
who would regulate such speech claim devotion to free speech
principles, while at the same time identifying a need to draw the
line between protected and unprotected speech in such a way as
to allow regulation of racist speech. The defenders of free speech,
on the other hand, argue their opposition to racism, while at the
same time insisting that the line between protected and unprotected
speech must be drawn so as to forbid regulation of at least some
racist speech. Thus, a fundamental issue of personal liberty appears
to be reduced to a technical line-drawing dispute between two
groups, both of whom cherish free speech and abhor racism.
The fact that reasonable people may reach different conclusions
about this question and the fact that the partisans on this issue
profess a set of shared values cannot disguise the fact that there
is a basic conflict between them: whether students should be
insulated from speech they find disturbing because of the message
that it conveys. Even apart from first amendment doctrine, there
is a substantial question whether we can achieve an increase in
tolerance through suppression of noxious views. Put another way,
is it realistically possible to impose an "enforced sensitivity" to
others?
My own view is that values of tolerance and pluralism are not
achieved by suppression of intolerant views. 4 Moreover, even if
the goals of racist speech policies were achievable, the price, in
the form of lost first amendment liberties, is simply too high. This
cost threatens to achieve monumental proportions when one considers the difficulty of developing a first amendment jurisprudence
that would uphold most racist speech codes but have no application
to other expression. In time, we may come to realize that to
sanction a rule that allows speech to be banned because listeners
find the message distressing is to make a compact with the Devil.
It is the purpose of this Symposium to provide a variety of
perspectives on one of the knottiest issues currently facing institutions of higher learning. If it causes readers to think about this
issue in new ways, it will have fulfilled its purpose.

4. See generally Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile Environment
Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHo ST. L. J. 481 (1991).

